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BOOK REVIEW
WALL STREET: SECURITY RISK. By Hurd Baruch. Washington:
Acropolis Books Ltd. 1971. Pp. xii, 356. $8.95.
Business was booming on Wall Street in 1968. In fact, business had
never been better. The average daily volume of shares traded on the
New York Stock Exchange (hereinafter referred to as N.Y.S.E.) in-
creased from 4.8 million in 1964 to nearly 13 million in 1968.' The
Exchange set four new single-day volume records in 1968-the first time
since October 29, 1929.2 Approximately 24 million Americans were
shareholders, with another 100 million persons participating indirectly
through their interests in mutual funds.3 To accommodate the increase
in business, N.Y.S.E. member firms opened nearly 1,000 new branch
offices in the same period (1964-68), bringing the total to 4,278.' Regis-
tered representatives, also known as account executives, increased in
number by almost 17,000 to a total of 49,644.1
Business was so good in fact that brokerage firms were literally
unable to handle it. Imagine General Motors closing down its plants one
day each week in the middle of a record sales year-the business world
would be dumbfounded! Yet, the N.Y.S.E. made a similar decision.
Such drastic action is more easily understood when one realizes the
serious problems that confronted the N.Y.S.E.
The securities industry was, and is, sales oriented. The primary aim
of the broker is to find customers who want to sell or buy securities,
from which transactions the firms make their commissions. Supporting
the sales force is an institution known as the "back office." The back
office staff of each firm is responsible for accomplishing the myriad
tasks which accompany the purchase or sale of a security, e.g., transfer,
payment, delivery, extension of credit, hypothecation, and borrowing
and lending securities. Traditionally, back office staffs have been the
neglected stepsisters of the debonair broker. Partners of brokerage firms
refused to direct their energies and cash to modernize and adequately
staff the operations departments. Perhaps it was not so much direct
refusal as ignorance of the need. In any event, the success of the sales
force in 1968 crippled the back offices. Customers waited months in
many cases for delivery of fully paid securities. Records of transactions
were incomplete and in error. Complaints against broker-dealers to the
I. H. BARUCH, WALL STREET: SECURITY RISK 86 (1971) [hereinafter cited as BARUCH].
2. id.
3. 34 SEC ANN. REP. xvii (1968).
4. BARUCH 89.
5. Id. at 88.
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Securities and Exchange Commission increased startlingly from about
4,000 in 1968 to nearly 13,000 in 1969, ninety percent of which related
to back office problems 8 In an attempt to relieve pressure on the back
offices, the decision was made to shorten daily trading hours and to
close the Exchange one day each week.7
The back office backlog, however, was not the only problem. In
March 1969, the long bear market began. Ultimately, the Dow Jones
Industrial Averages fell from the all-time high of 968 in January 1969
to a low of 631 in May 1970.8 For brokerage firms, the effect of this
sustained decline in the value of stocks was not merely a slackening of
business. The average daily volume in the summer of 1970, while less
than in 1968, was still 7 to 8 million shares a day, well above its pre-
1964 levels.' However, the decline in the value of securities in firm
investment accounts and of customer securities used by the firms as
collateral for loans, together with the loss of revenues from commis-
sions, was the undoing of many firms with already frail capital struc-
tures. On top of the still unresolved back office chaos of 1968, the
results were disastrous. As a result of these pressures, over a hundred
member firms of the N.Y.S.E. became defunct during 1969-70, and
many more firms were perilously close behind. In addition, the accounts
of hundreds of thousands of small investors were frozen for long periods
of time."
Is anyone responsible for such happenings? Can anything be done
to prevent a reoccurrence? Hurd Baruch supplies an emphatic "yes" to
both queries in Wall Street: Security Risk. Mr. Baruch, an S.E.C.
lawyer, places the blame on the N.Y.S.E. for its failure to regulate its
members adequately and sets forth specific recommendations for
change. The seriousness of his indictment of the N.Y.S.E. and the scope
of his recommendations demand analysis.
For those unfamiliar with the Congressional scheme for the regula-
tion of the securities industry, a few words are in order. In an effort to
insure free and honest securities markets following the stock market
crash of 1929, Congress enacted six major pieces of legislation relating
to the securities industry and established the S.E.C. to administer the
Acts.' 2 The Securities Exchange Act of 193411 is the Act most relevant
6. 35 SEC ANN. REP. 2 (1969).
7. 34 SEC ANN. REP. 16 (1968).
8. BARUCH 145.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 149.
II. Id. at 15.
12. The six acts administered by the S.E.C. are: (I) Securities Act of 1933 (15
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to an analysis of Baruch's book. Among other things, the Exchange Act
provides for the registration of broker-dealers with the S.E.C.,1' requires
the registration of national securities exchanges with the S.E.C., 5 pro-
hibits various activities of broker-dealers, including market manipula-
tion" and fraud in the purchase or sale of securities, 7 sets forth certain
ground rules for the operation of a brokerage business for the protection
of investors, 8 and empowers the S.E.C. to promulgate rules and regula-
tions in the public interest. An important element in this particular
legislative scheme is the provision for self-regulation of registered ex-
changes. Thus, the N.Y.S.E., by registering with the S.E.C., became
obligated to establish rules for its members designed to protect investors
and to enforce compliance with its own rules, as well as the rules of the
S.E.C.'9 Thus, the N.Y.S.E. has the primary duty to enforce the securi-
ties laws, while the S.E.C. retains residual power. It is within the context
of this legislative scheme that Baruch indicts the N.Y.S.E. as being
primarily responsible for the failure to police brokerage firms ade-
quately, thereby contributing substantially to the chaos of 1968-70. Bar-
uch does not find the same fault with the S.E.C., claiming that the
Commission knew what was happening but was powerless to act di-
rectly.
It should be made clear at this point that the Commission's regula-
tory powers, although residual, provide some methods for controlling
the N.Y.S.E. and its members. Section 19(b) of the Exchange Act spe-
cifically empowers the S.E.C. "by rule or order" to "alter" or "supple-
ment" rules of the N.Y.S.E. for the protection of investors or in the
public interest. Further, Section 19(a) of the Exchange Act empowers
the S.E.C. to suspend or withdraw completely the registration of the
Exchange for failure to enforce compliance with the S.E.C.'s rules. That
the S.E.C. has been hesitant to use such powers is perhaps politically
understandable. Nevertheless, if by hindsight we are able to isolate
U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa), (2) Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj), (3) Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 (15 U.S.C. §§ 79a-70z), (4) Trust Indenture Act of 1939
(15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbb), (5) Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. § 80a) and (6)
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. § 80b). In addition, the Commission has advisory
responsibilities under the Bankruptcy Act, Chapter X (II U.S.C. ch. 10).
13. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1934), as amended, 1964, 1970 [hereinafter cited and referred to
as Exchange Act].
14. Exchange Act § 15.
15. Id. § 6.
16. Id. § 9.
17. Id. § 10(b).
18. E.g., Id. § 8(b).
19. Id. § 6(a)(1).
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instances wherein the N.Y.S.E. failed to regulate its members ade-
quately, the S.E.C. cannot be characterized as having been either power-
less or blameless.
Baruch describes ten failures of the N.Y.S.E. in the 1968-70 era. 0
As his complaints are reviewed below, it should be noted that there are
areas of substantial agreement between this reviewer and Baruch. How-
ever, this reviewer disagrees with Baruch's contentions that the S.E.C.
is blameless and that the N.Y.S.E. is completely negligent. An accurate
appraisal of the crisis on Wall Street in 1968-70 must put the role of
the S.E.C. in perspective.
(1) The N.Y.S.E. and its member firms failed to plan adequately
for the increasing business of 1968, thereby causing the back office
chaos. Brokerage firms could not handle the paperwork caused by a
rapidly increasing volume of business in 1968. Ironically, a study com-
missioned by the N.Y.S.E. in the mid-1960's had projected daily volume
on the N.Y.S.E. to double by 1975 to about 7.6 million shares., In fact,
as noted earlier, the volume more than tripled by 1968, to nearly 13
million shares per day. Clearly, the study itself is evidence that the
Exchange was engaged in some planning, but more significantly, that
nobody (including the S.E.C.) suspected the degree to which business
would in fact grow. Nevertheless, it is clear that brokerage firms tradi-
tionally have neglected the back offices. Wall Street-the symbol of
American business-is, in reality, its most poorly managed branch.
Back offices have been understaffed and their workers underpayed and
undertrained. Wall Street has been too slow to take advantage of the
computer to streamline its complicated paperwork operations.2 While
law has often motivated management reform, it undoubtedly failed in
the case of securities management from 1964 to 1968. The S.E.C., after
the paperwork crunch was upon back office staffs, did, however, notify
the industry that it would consider it a violation of the anti-fraud provi-
sions of the Exchange Act for firms to accept orders if they were not
able to deliver cash and securities to customers promptly.23 This move
by the S.E.C. was an admission of its power to act; however, it was also
a demonstration that the S.E.C., as well as the N.Y.S.E., acted too little
and too late to be effective.
20. Baruch summarizes the ten N.Y.S.E. failures in Chapter 16, the last. His book in general
presents arguments in support of the ten complaints.
21. 35 SEC ANN. REP. 1 (1969).
22. BARUCH ch. 5.
23. SEC Securities Act Release No. 8363 (July 29, 1968).
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(2) The Exchange failed to implement a consistent and effective
program for imposing restrictions on firms undergoing operational
strains. Baruch contends that, had the Exchange adequately inspected
its member firms, it would have known the problems being caused by
the paperwork jam. Furthermore, the N.Y.S.E. was ineffective even in
those cases in which it had knowledge of the problems.24 In this context,
it is instructive to note that the S.E.C., with the power to inspect books
and records of broker-dealers, actually conducted fewer investigations
during the crisis of 1968 (514)25 than it had in 1966 (1,272).26 This decline
in the number of investigations was caused in part by financial restraints
upon the Commission, necessitating a change from regular inspections
to surprise inspections. However, if the S.E.C. knew that the N.Y.S.E.'s
enforcement methods were ineffective and that the protection of inves-
tors was at stake, why did it not act? As noted above, not only has the
S.E.C. power to demand enforcement of both Commission and Ex-
change rules by the N.Y.S.E., 27 but also the power to "alter" or "supple-
ment" inadequate Exchange rules, including safeguards regarding finan-
cial responsibility, 28 hours of trading,2 9 time and method of settling
transactions and delivery,3" and "similar matters."'31
A further element in Baruch's second complaint is that whatever
the restrictions upon Exchange members were, they were not applied
consistently by the N.Y.S.E. That is, "old line" members of the Ex-
change constituted a "club," the members of which were treated more
favorably than newcomers.32 This complaint is no doubt true. Robert
W. Haack, President of the N.Y.S.E., who receives a good deal of
criticism from Baruch, has been, interestingly, Wall Street's most vocal
opponent of "clubbiness" in the Exchange.3 3 But has the S.E.C. alto-
gether avoided the same preferential treatment of club members? Take,
for example, the S.E.C. action against Lehman Bros., an old line mem-
ber of the Exchange.24
In August 1968, the Commission began administrative proceedings
24. BARUCH ch. 6.
25. 34 SEC ANN. REP. 96 (1968).
26. 32 SEC ANN. REP. 62 (1966).
27. Exchange Act § 19(a).
28. Id. § 19(b)(1).
29. Id. § 19(b)(4).
30. Id. § 19(b)(7).
31. Id. § 19(b)(13).
32. BARUCH ch. 13.
33. E.g., Address by Robert W. Haack to Economic Club of New York, November 17, 1970,
quoted in Wall Street Journal, November 18, 1970, at 3.
34. See BARUCH 105-11 for his account of the S.E.C.'s action.
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against the firm for failing to make accurate and keep current certain
books and records in accordance with the federal securities laws. One
may first wonder why the Commission did not act against all firms
regulated inadequately by the Exchange, since the action against Leh-
man Bros. was an admission of such power. Nevertheless, let us examine
the Lehman Bros. case in the light of Baruch's charge of club preference
by the N.Y.S.E. At first glance, the Commission's actions against Leh-
man Bros. seem to support Baruch's contention that the S.E.C. plays
no favorites. However, the S.E.C. could have suspended or revoked the
firm's registration; in fact, it did neither. Baruch terms the Commis-
sion's action as "spectacularly successful," because,
[iun return for dropping the suspension issue, the Commission
got various commitments from the firm, chiefly that it would
resolve its remaining deficiencies in accordance with a specific
program and that it would hold transactions down.35
Additionally, the S.E.C. dropped allegations against the managing part-
ner because the final order of the Commission censured all general
partners. In other words, the Commission's "tougher" enforcement pol-
icy amounted merely to a slap on the wrist and a request for a promise
to clean up the mess.
Obviously, the exercise of enforcement discretion is a complicated
matter. However, both the N.Y.S.E. and the S.E.C. seem to take a
softer line against members of the club and both must share the blame
for the resulting perversion of the public interest.
(3) The N. Y.S.E. did not act to "choke off the tremendous surge
of volume" in Exchange business.
Baruch's argument is that, had the N.Y.S.E. acted to ban adver-
tisements, curtail the hiring of registered representatives and restrict the
opening of new offices, member firms would have done less business,
thereby alleviating the back office problem .3 One might first question
whether the N.Y.S.E. ought to have the power to prohibit advertising
or to limit the public's access to the securities markets by purposely
limiting the number of offices and sales personnel. Even if it is assumed
that the Exchange should have such power, Baruch's allegation that the
Exchange did not act to restrict business seems somewhat inaccurate.
In June 1968, the Exchange requested member firms, especially
those with severe back office problems, to reduce advertising and pro-
35. BARUCH 108-09.
36. Id. at 136.
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motion, to cease solicitation of over-the-counter transactions, to reduce
or discontinue firm trading, to disallow commission credit on securities
selling at less than $5, $7, or $10, and to terminate registered representa-
tives who did not strictly observe industry and firm policies. 7 Although
these measures were too little and too late, they do manifest at least
some form of action by the Exchange.
Meanwhile, the S.E.C., though possessing the power to alleviate
market pressures, did little more than issue halfhearted threats. In July
1968, the S.E.C. warned brokers that:
Broker-dealers who are unable to consummate all their securi-
ties transactions promptly in accordance with traditional cus-
toms and usage of trade, or who are encountering any delays
because of back-office problems of any kind, are compounding
their difficulties and increasing the likelihood of disciplinary
action being taken against them if during any such period they
advertise, employ additional salesmen, or take any other action
designed to expand the volume of their businesses."8
This policy statement was an admission of S.E.C. power and, in view
of its timing, as belated as the N.Y.S.E.'s own action. More important,
the S.E.C. failed to follow up its policy statement with action.
(4) After the trading volume dropped in 1969, the N. Y.S.E. did
not require members to "clean up the paperwork blizzard." Mr.
Baruch's criticism is quite accurate. However, it should also be pointed
out that the S.E.C. similarly failed to use its power to demand that the
Exchange enforce compliance with both Exchange and Commission
rules.
(5) The Exchange misinformed Congress and the public about the
financial crisis during 1969-70. If Baruch is suggesting a willful design
to misinform Congress, such a charge is, of course, serious. However,
it is more likely that Baruch is merely criticizing the Exchange for its
faulty analysis of the severity of the crisis. Whichever is the case, it is
obvious that the S.E.C., in its official messages to Congress during those
years, issued misleading statements. In the 1968 annual report of the
Commission, the S.E.C. announced that it was "actively oversee[ing]"
the Exchange. 9 The S.E.C. further admitted that it had the power to
change the rules of the Exchange to protect investors, 0 but omitted to
37. Id. at 130.
38. SEC Securities Act Release No. 8363 (July 29, 1968).
39. 34 SEC ANN. REP. 67 (1968).
40. Id. at 62.
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state that it had not used that power in spite of the need. Out of a total
of 192 pages, only one and one-half were devoted to a description of
" 'Back Office' Problems,"'" which problems, the report conceded, had
resulted from the "unforeseen level of volume" in trading. The report
went on to say that the Commission
has stressed the responsibility of individual firms and the self-
regulatory agencies to deal with these problems and has
encouraged them to take all necessary measures. . . . Where
violations have been found, appropriate enforcement action
has been taken. 2
The Commission's description of the back office problem failed to dis-
close that the S.E.C. had abstained from using the full extent of its
power to protect investors. At best, its description of the back office
problem was understated.
(6) The N. Y.S.E. failed to protect adequately customers' funds
and securities used in the operation of the brokerage business. Perhaps
to the surprise of many readers, brokerage firms exist on terribly fragile
capital structures. Working capital to carry on the firms' operations is
dependent, to a large extent, on the use of customers' funds and securi-
ties on deposit. In fact, as Baruch points out, equity capital supplied by
the owners of brokerage firms usually amounts to a good deal less
than the funds available for use from customers,' 3 leading Baruch to
observe: "What is unique about the stock market is that the amateur
players in the market stake the professionals with the cash and securities
they need for playing the game!""
Customers' funds used in the operation of the business are available
directly from free credit balances and indirectly from the use of custom-
ers' securities. Free credit balances represent customers' cash on deposit
with brokers, the cash representing the proceeds of a sale or cash having
been deposited prior to an order to purchase. In any event, the funds,
which are substantial, are available for use by the firms. Baruch esti-
mates the aggregate amount available to all N.Y.S.E. firms in recent
years as varying between 2 and 3.7 billion dollars. 5 According to
Baruch, firms can earn about 262.5 million dollars annual profit from
the use of these funds (assuming free credit balances of 3 billion dollars
and an 8.75% interest rate)."
41. Id. at 16-17.
42. Id. (emphasis added).
43. BARUCH ch. 1.
44. Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
45. Id. at 21.
46. Id. at 25.
[Vol. 7
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Customers' securities on deposit with firms include fully paid secur-
ities left for safekeeping, as well as securities purchased on credit (mar-
gin). Such securities are used by firms (1) for hypothecation (pledged
as collateral on loans), (2) for lending to other firms (for which 100%
cash deposits are received, which deposits can be used), and (3) for
delivery to other customers or brokers to cover purchases for which the
firm does not have securities on hand. Section 8(c) of the Exchange Act
prohibits firms from commingling customers' securities with securities
under a lien unless the customers consent in writing. The same section
also prohibits the hypothecation of customers' securities in an amount
exceeding the aggregate indebtedness of all customers to the firm. Sec-
tion 8(d) of the Exchange Act prohibits the lending of customers' securi-
ties without their written consent. When viewed realistically, however,
the requirement of consent affords little protection to the customer. As
Baruch points out, all customers "agree" to the commingling and lend-
ing of their securities when they open their accounts. 7 Furthermore, in
times of financial crisis, the temptation to pledge securities on loans
over and above the aggregate indebtedness of all customers is great.
Nevertheless, the rules, such as they are, could have been enforced by
the Commission. According to the S.E.C.'s 1969 annual report, how-
ever, its program of surprise inspections of 732 broker-dealers turned
up only four instances of improper hypothecation."
Baruch recommends rules that would require brokerage firms to
establish cash reserves against the amount of customers' securities and
funds used in the operation of the business, and limit the use of custom-
ers' funds and securities to the financing of margin accounts. 9 If the
S.E.C. lacked power in the past to promulgate such rules, Congress has
now mandated such action in a 1970 amendment to Section 15 of the
Exchange Act. The amendment gives the Commission power to make
rules
for the protection of investors to provide safeguards with re-
spect to the financial responsibility and related practices of
broker-dealers including, but not limited to, the acceptance of
custody and use of customers' securities, and the carrying and
use of customers' deposits or credit balances. Such rules and
regulations shall require the maintenance of reserves.0
47. Id. at 54.
48. 35 SEC ANN. REP. 88 (1969).
49. BARUCH 250-65.
50. Exchange Act § 15(c)(3), as amended December 30, 1970 (emphasis added).
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The ball is now in the Commission's hands."
(7) The Exchange refused to take adequate steps to insure the
liquidity of memberfirms. Both the S.E.C.2 and the N.Y.S.E. 3 have
so-called net capital rules. These rules are designed to insure liquidity
of brokerage firms against the obvious hazards resulting from exposure
of customer cash and securities on deposit to loss. In the most simple
terms, the present S.E.C. and the N.Y.S.E. rules are similar: a firm's
aggregate indebtedness may not exceed 2000 per centum (20:1 ratio) of
its net capital. The catch, of course, is in defining those terms to be
included in arriving at net capital and aggregate indebtedness. During
the crisis of 1968-70, the N.Y.S.E. interpretation was more lenient, thus
permitting firms to continue operating under conditions which would
not have been tolerated under the S.E.C.'s interpretation. 4 Baruch be-
moans the fact that the N.Y.S.E. rule prevailed. At this point the facts
should be consulted in an attempt to understand the circumstances
under which the N.Y.S.E. rule prevailed.
The Exchange Act provides in Section 8(b) for the net capital rule
to be applied to N.Y.S.E. firms according to such rules as the S.E.C.
may prescribe. The S.E.C., however, never prescribed any such rule.
The Commission did promulgate a net capital rule pursuant to another
section of the Exchange Act (§ 15(c)(3)),11 but exempted the N.Y.S.E.
from its coverage. It was provided, however, that the exemption could
be withdrawn on ten days notice if the "protection of investors" war-
ranted. First, it must be noted that the S.E.C. was not required to
exempt the Exchange. Second, it is clear that the S.E.C. retained the
ultimate power to remove the exemption. Therefore, to the extent that
the N.Y.S.E. rule worked to the detriment of investors (as it clearly
did), the S.E.C. could have made a more stringent rule applicable. Not
having done so, the Commission must share the blame for the adverse
consequences.
(8) The N.Y.S.E. refused to take enforcement action in some
cases and sometimes blocked Commission action. As mentioned pre-
viously, Section 19(a) of the Exchange Act empowers the S.E.C. to
proceed against the Exchange for failing to enforce compliance with its
51. The S.E.C. has proposed Rule 15(c)(3-3) (not yet effective) which would require cash
reserves and limit the use of customers' funds. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 9622 (June 4,
1972).
52. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (1970).
53. N.Y.S.E. CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS Rule 325.
54. See BARUCH 177-88 for an analysis of the weaknesses of the N.Y.S.E. rule.
55. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (1970).
56. Id. § 240.15c3-1(b)(2).
[Vol. 7
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rules or the federal securities laws. Further, as already noted, the Com-
mission, by its own admission, had the power to enforce the securities
laws directly against member firms. In this same context, Baruch is
critical of the Exchange's use of its Special Trust Fund, established to
protect customers of insolvent member firms. The fact remains, how-
ever, that the N.Y.S.E., through its members, will have provided, ac-
cording to Baruch's own estimate, approximately 125 million dollars to
protect customers of member firms.57 The S.E.C., through no fault of
its own, is powerless to recover a single cent for such investors. Hope-
fully, the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 will partially fill
this need by insuring customer accounts up to $50,000.1
(9) The N. Y.S.E. did not take advantage of technological possi-
bilities to improve the industry's operation. Baruch criticizes the Ex-
change both for its failure to make better use of the computer in trans-
acting business and for its failure to move toward a "certificateless"
operation." This reviewer is in complete accord with such criticism. The
use of negotiable stock certificates, which must be hand-delivered, held
for safekeeping and re-issued in the names of new owners, causes untold
delay and congestion in the back office. The elimination of stock certifi-
cates and the use of computers to record sales, amount and ownership
would relieve the paperwork backlog in the back offices and decrease
expenses (Baruch estimates a cost reduction of one-third). 0
(10) The N. Y.S.E. refused to give up its monopolistic fixed-
commission rate scheme. The member firms of the N.Y.S.E. operate
under a minimum fixed-commission structure. Baruch, among others,
urges that commissions be negotiated. 1 While Baruch singles out the
Exchange as being responsible for the failure to change, it must be noted
that the S.E.C. has the power, pursuant to Section 19(b) of the Ex-
change Act, to "alter" or "supplement" Exchange rules dealing with the
fixing of reasonable rates. Only after significant pressure from the
Department of Justice in early 19693 did the Commission begin to re-
evaluate fixed commissions seriously. Even then, the S.E.C. did not
finally work out a plan by which commissions on orders exceeding
57. BARUCH 307-08.
58. Pub. L. No. 91-598 (December 30, 1970).
59. BARUCH 279-86.
60. Id. at 282.
61. Id. at 291-97.
62. Exchange Act § 19(b)(9).
63. Memorandum of the U.S. Department of Justice on the Fixed Minimum Rate Structure
at 193-95, submitted at S.E.C. Rate Structure Hearings (January 1969).
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$500,000 could be negotiated until early 1971.11 The question of negoti-
ated versus fixed commissions is not a simple matter. While Baruch
cites Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., the nation's largest
firm, as favoring negotiated commissions, 5 it should be noted that Mer-
rill Lynch is precisely the kind of firm that would benefit by such a
change because of the tremendous volume of their business. Small
trades (odd-lots and 100 or 200 share lots) are not profitable unless
volume is large. Thus, with smaller, negotiated commissions, small
firms would be unable to compete with larger firms like Merrill Lynch.
While Baruch advises a healthy dose of competition for Wall Street,"6
he admits that freely negotiated commissions might result in the crea-
tion of only "several dozen large regional and nationwide firms." 7
However, there appears to be no reason why commissions on large
institutional orders ought not to be freely negotiated in view of the high
margin of profit. The present scheme by which trades over $500,000 can
be negotiated is a step in the right direction, but the limit ought to be
much lower.
This review of Baruch's ten major complaints against the N.Y.S.E.
is not intended, on the whole, as an expression of complete disagree-
ment. If, however, the regulatory failures of 1969-70 are to be described
and evaluated accurately, the S.E.C. must share criticism with the
N.Y.S.E. While it is true that, under the legislative scheme, the
N.Y.S.E. is granted the power to regulate itself, it is also true that the
S.E.C. was not, and is not, powerless to intervene.
Baruch's argument, of course, is that self-regulation has been a
failure and consequently all, or at least more, power must reside in the
Commission. 8 It is not clear, however, that the Commission has made
full use of the power it now commands. This reviewer does not agree
with Baruch that "(c)ertainly, it is clear that the Commission has not
been and is not now captive of the industry it regulates."' By failing to
correct inadequate Exchange rules, by failing to enforce the federal
securities laws fully and by failing to use available legal means to disci-
pline the Exchange for not regulating its members adequately, the
S.E.C. seems to have breached its statutory duty to protect investors.
In no small way, perhaps, is this due to a ridiculously low budget.
64. SEC Securities Act Release No. 9079 (February 11, 1971).
65. BARUCH 293.
66. Id. at xii.
67. Id. at 297.
68. Baruch generally argues against self-regulation. But see BARUCH 299.
69. BARUCH 312.
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In 1970, for instance, the S.E.C. budget was a mere 21.9 million dollars,
as compared to the N.Y.S.E. budget of 69 million.7" More important,
the actual cost to taxpayers to support the Commission was only 6.4
million dollars, inasmuch as fees paid to the S.E.C. annually provide
the majority of the budget. If Baruch's book does no more than moti-
vate Congress to allocate more realistic funds to the S.E.C., it will be a
success.
Baruch's efforts are most significant in that they present an analy-
sis of that hitherto ignored institution-the back office. However, if
essential changes are to be made in the regulation of the securities
industry, the failures of the S.E.C., as well as the N.Y.S.E., must not
be ignored.
Fredrich H. Thomforde, Jr.*
70. Id. at 313.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law.
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